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Abstract  Why are humans so vulnerable to pain in interpersonal relations and can so 
easily hurt others physically and emotionally?  We theoretically examine whether 
being offensively strong but defensively weak can evolve as a strategic trait that 
fosters cooperation.  We study a population comprised of “thick-skinned” and “thin-
skinned” agents by using an indirect evolution model that combines rational choice in 
strategic interactions with evolutionary selection across generations.  We find that (a) 
the relatively vulnerable and cooperative thin-skins cannot evolve under purely 
random matching, (b) with some assortment thin-skins evolve and can take over the 
entire population, (c) vulnerability to greater pain makes it easier for thin-skins to 
evolve, and (d) proximate pain which merely feels bad but does not lower fitness helps 
thin-skins evolve even more than pain which accurately reflects fitness consequences.  
We draw contrast with the Hawk-Dove model and identify several ways in which 
rationality hinders the evolution of the relatively vulnerable and peaceful type of agent. 
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1. Introduction 
Human vulnerability to suffer psychological and physical pain from 
interacting with others is so obvious that it is easy to overlook how remarkable a 
trait it is.  But upon some reflection, it appears remarkable that almost anyone can 
easily hurt anyone else nearby, physically or emotionally.  Whether they know 
each other or not, any two people near each other are only seconds away from 
inflicting or feeling pain through words, gestures, or physical violence.  Despite 
the fact that fingernails, fists, teeth, sticks, and stones have been ubiquitous in the 
environment in which humans have evolved, human skin and flesh are not well 
adapted to protect against such weapons.  Human anatomy and posture leave 
digestive and reproductive organs exposed to blows and projectiles.  Common 
greeting rituals such as bowing, hugging, and kissing momentarily escalate the 
vulnerability to even greater heights.  Psychologically, one can deeply hurt another 
merely by uttering a few words.  Even a child can drive a parent or teacher to tears.  
Evidently, interpersonal relations are carried on in the shadow of much potential 
pain.  We will generically refer to this widespread human trait – the vulnerability 
to physical and psychological pain in interpersonal relations – as “thin skin.” 
Thin skin is puzzling in the Darwinian framework, since it is obvious how 
this trait can hinder an individual in its struggle to acquire resources necessary for 
survival and reproduction, but it is not clear how the trait can help.1  Thin skin is 
at odds with the tendency noted by evolutionary biologists that “evolution produces 
shields to its own weapons” (Hamilton, 1971, p. 218), i.e., that evolution usually 
gives rise to arms’ races that escalate but balance offensive and defensive 
capabilities.   
Our goal is to explore an evolutionary logic that can account for thin skin 
in connection with another distinctive human trait, the propensity to cooperate.  In 
principle, thin skin and cooperation could be causally related in both directions.  It 
may be the case that thin skin is a byproduct of the high degree of cooperation 
achieved in most interpersonal relations most of the time, making the fitness cost of 
thick skin not worth the fitness benefit it could provide.  Although we do not 
pursue this possibility, it appears doubtful as the main reason for the evolution of 
thin skin given that pain in many interpersonal relations, even (especially?) among 
genetically related individuals, is hardly uncommon.  For instance, not being so 
sensitive to hurtful words arguably could be a useful and perhaps not prohibitively 
expensive shield; and yet many people must go through life without one, always at 
the mercy of others who might and sometimes do utter such words at them.  This 
suggests that vulnerability to pain may be more of a cause rather than consequence 
of cooperation.  We pursue this possibility and seek to identify a strategic role 
played by thin skin that yields its bearers a fitness advantage. 
We conduct our analysis using a game-theoretic model in which there is 
both evolutionary selection and rational choice.  The indirect evolutionary 
approach (Guth and Kliemt, 1998) that we follow allows us to explicitly treat in an 
integrated way both a long-run population-level selection process as well as short-
                                                  
1 In the physiological context, vulnerability to pain has a straightforward evolutionary explanation 
as a mechanism that induces efforts to alleviate hunger, avoid burns and falls, etc.  In light of the 
many examples of evolution adapting pre-existing organs to new functions, it is conceivable that 
physiological pain mechanisms have evolved to also become engaged in the social context, which is 
our exclusive focus.   
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run individual-level rational choice behavior.2  We accomplish this by taking 
vulnerability to pain to be an immutable lifelong trait of an individual, a trait which 
is selected by an evolutionary process and which in turn affects payoffs facing the 
individual as he chooses payoff-maximizing actions in specific strategic 
interactions that arise during his lifetime.  The prospect of pain causes vulnerable 
individuals to aggress less, and under certain conditions this raises the average 
fitness of vulnerable individuals relative to the non-vulnerable ones who get into 
more fights.  Pain can play this strategic role only if it is credible, that is, only if 
individuals cannot rationally override their vulnerability to pain. This is our 
explanation for why evolution not only avoids producing shields to its own 
weapons, but even makes it difficult for individuals to develop such shields, such as 
by training oneself to not be sensitive to hurtful words or physical pain. 
In our model, there is a population composed of thick-skinned and thin-
skinned agents.  Each generation, the agents are paired, and each dyad plays a 
demand game to divide a resource.  Each agent in a dyad may either aggress by 
demanding all or seek to compromise by demanding half.  Bilateral aggression 
leads to a fight which wastes some of the resource and also inflicts pain on agents 
with thin skin.  Bilateral compromise leads to fair division without waste or pain.  
A unilateral effort to compromise backfires in the sense that the agent who 
aggressed gets the entire resource, but there is no waste or pain.  Payoffs earned in 
dyads are treated as fitness that determines population shares of thin- and thick-
skinned agents in the next generation via a replicator dynamics. 
We fully specify this model in the next section and then proceed to study 
conditions under which thin-skinned agents evolve.  We explore several variants 
of the model as follows.  In Section 3 we analyze the case of complete type 
information, i.e., we assume that each agent can observe the skin of the opponent in 
its dyad.  In Section 4 we decouple proximate payoffs from ultimate fitness, 
assuming that the prospect of feeling pain influences an agent’s decision-making 
but actually experiencing pain does not reduce fitness.  In Section 5 we drop the 
assumption that types are observable within dyads and instead assume that agents 
only know population shares of each type and the degree of assortment.  In 
Section 6 we assume the demand game in dyads is played sequentially rather than 
simultaneously.  In Section 7 we discuss our results in comparison with the Hawk-
Dove model of conflict and the evolutionary analysis of the trust game. 
We find that (a) thin-skins cannot evolve under purely random matching, 
(b) with some assortment thin-skins evolve and can even take over the entire 
population, and (c) the greater the pain, the lesser the degree of assortment needed 
to sustain any given positive population share of thin-skins in equilibrium.  
Comparing the case of proximate pain to fitness-reducing pain, we find that thin 
skin can evolve with a lower degree of assortment if the pain merely causes bad 
feelings but does not actually reduce fitness.  Based on this finding, we argue that 
evolution may favor pain which exaggerates fitness consequences.  Comparing the 
case in which agents can observe others’ skin thickness to the case in which they 
only know population shares and degree of assortment, we find the “veil of 
uncertainty” of the latter case helps thin-skins evolve.  Based on these findings 
and the comparison with the Hawk-Dove model, we argue that more information 
and greater rationality hinder the evolution of the type of agent who relies on 
vulnerability to earn a peace dividend.  
 
                                                  
2 Our model lies in the middle range of the spectrum between rational-choice “teleology” and zero-
intelligence “direct evolution,” as discussed by Berninghaus, Guth and Kliemt (2003).   
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2. The model 
 A large population consists of two types of agents: type A agents who have 
thick skin and type B agents who have thin skin.  Alternatively, the agents may be 
visualized as anatomically identical but differently armed: type A carrying both a 
sword and a shield and type B only a sword. 
 Each generation, agents are paired according to a random process which we 
will specify below.  After being paired, agents in each dyad first observe each 
other’s type3 and then play a demand game to divide one unit of a resource.  In 
the demand game, each agent can demand either ALL or HALF of the resource.  
Agents announce their demands simultaneously.4  Three outcomes are possible.  
First, “compromise” is the outcome that ensues if both agents demand HALF.  In 
this outcome each agent gets half of the resource.  Second, “exploitation” is the 
outcome that ensues if one agent demands ALL and the other agent demands HALF.  
In this outcome, the agent who demanded all gets the entire resource and the agent 
who tried compromising gets nothing.  Third, a “fight” ensues if both agents 
demand ALL.  The expected net payoff that an agent of type i gets if it fights an 
agent of type j will be denoted by Fij.  This amount includes portion of the 
resource obtained by agent i at the end of the fight minus the cost of the fight itself 
such as energy spent and injury or pain suffered.  The payoff matrix of the demand 
game is shown in Figure 1.  The payoffs of the demand game represent fitness that 
determines the composition of the next generation via a standard replicator 
dynamics, except in Section 4 where we explicitly decouple fitness from demand 
game payoffs. 
 Let us first consider a dyad with two thick-skinned agents.  Because they 
are well-protected, we will assume that a fight between two type-A agents is in 
effect like a Tullock-style rent-seeking contest that dissipates some but not all of the 
prize and leaves both agents with a positive expected net payoff.  
 
Assumption 1.   210 << AAF  
 
Under this assumption, the demand game of Figure 1 played between two thick-
skins is a Prisoners’ Dilemma with the unique equilibrium (ALL, ALL) and payoff 
AAAA F=π .  If all agents in the population are thick-skinned, every dyad will 
always allocate the resource via fighting and thereby dissipate AAF21− .  Against 
this baseline of constant and wasteful fighting between thick-skins, we want to 
explore conditions under which a relatively more vulnerable and peaceful type of 
agent can evolve.  Our thin-skinned type B agent is unprotected and therefore 
suffers pain and injury if he gets into a fight, regardless of the type of his opponent.  
We model this by assuming that the pain outweighs the potential gain from the 
fight: 
 
Assumption 2.  },{0 BAiF iB ∈∀<  
 
Under this assumption, the demand game of Figure 1 played between two thin-
skins is a game of Chicken.  To simplify notation without substantively changing 
the results, we will assume that the pain a thin-skinned agent suffers in a fight is the 
                                                  
3 We will relax the observability assumption in Section 5. 
4 We will study the case of sequentially announced demands in Section 6. 
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same regardless of the type of its opponent and denote this pain by BBAB FFF =≡ .  
In the symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, a thin-skinned agent paired with 
another such agent plays ALL with probability5 
F21
1
−=θ      (1) 
and earns expected payoff  
),0(
12 2
1∈−= F
F
BBπ
    (2) 
Since 0/ <∂∂ FBBπ  and more negative values of F correspond to greater pain, the 
expected payoff of a thin-skinned agent in a homogeneous dyad is monotonically 
increasing in the degree of pain to which it is vulnerable. 
Finally, we must consider the demand game played in a heterogeneous 
dyad.  If a fight breaks out, the thick-skinned agent will waste some effort fighting 
but he is likely to get most of the resource and will not suffer pain.  We model this 
via 
 
Assumption 3.   121 << ABF  
 
 Under this assumption, exploitation is the unique Nash equilibrium in the 
demand game of Figure 1 played by a heterogeneous dyad.  In the equilibrium, the 
thick-skinned agent demands ALL and the thin-skinned agent demands HALF, 
there is no fighting or pain, and the payoffs are 1=ABπ  and 0=BAπ . 
 
Since thin-skinned agents have a comparative disadvantage in 
heterogenous dyads ( ABBA ππ < ), unless they have a comparative advantage when 
paired homogenously their evolution would be impossible.  Thus, a necessary 
condition for the evolution of thin-skins is for them to earn more when paired 
together than what thick-skins earn in their homo-dyads; i.e.,  AABB ππ > .  We 
will assume this condition holds.  In particular, using AAAA F=π  and (2), we 
express the condition in the form of the following minimum pain threshold:   
 
 
Assumption 4.  
12 −< AA
AA
F
FF  
 
Notably, if thin-skins are not sufficiently vulnerable to pain, they cannot evolve.  
And since the threshold in Assumption 4 is decreasing in AAF , the less wasteful the 
fighting is among thick-skins, the more pain is necessary for thin-skins to have 
some comparative advantage. 
 
Having specified the details of the interaction in each of the three possible 
dyads, we can summarize the payoffs to each type of agent in each type of dyad 
using the reduced-form payoff matrix of Figure 2.  This payoff matrix represents 
                                                  
5 Alternatively, we could interpret θ  as the fraction of thin-skins that always demand ALL in 
homo-dyads and θ−1  as the fraction of thin-skins that always demand HALF in homo-dyads.   
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the stage game of the evolutionary game that we will analyze below.  For all 
values of FAA and F possible under Assumptions 1 through 3, B is a strictly 
dominated strategy of the stage game and AA is the unique Nash equilibrium.  If 
the thin-skinned agents are not sufficiently vulnerable to satisfy Assumption 4, then 
AA is the Pareto-efficient outcome of the stage game, thin-skin offers no fitness 
gain, and therefore such thin–skinned agents cannot evolve.  If the thin-skinned 
agents are sufficiently vulnerable to satisfy Assumption 4, the stage game is a 
Prisoners’ Dilemma with equilibrium outcome AA being Pareto-dominated by 
outcome BB. 
 
3. Evolutionary analysis 
 Let ]1,0[∈p  be the fraction of thin-skinned type B agents in the 
population in a given generation.  We first assume that in each generation agents 
are paired purely at random and show that only thick-skins survive in equilibrium. 
 
Proposition 1.   
Under purely random pairing of agents, the only evolutionarily stable population is 
thick-skin monomorphic, p = 0. 
 
Proof.   
A thin-skinned mutant cannot invade a population of all thick-skins since 
),0(0 21∈<= AABA ππ .  Thus p = 0 is evolutionarily stable.  A thick-skinned 
mutant can invade a population of all thin-skins since ),0(1 21∈>= BBAB ππ .  
Hence, p = 1 is not evolutionarily stable.  The average fitness of the two types in a 
polymorphic population )1,0(∈p  is given by
ppppAV AAABAA +−=+−= πππ )1()1()(  and 
BBBABB pppBV πππ =−+= )1()( .  Since 
0)1()1()()( >−+−=− BBAA ppBVAV ππ  for all )1,0(∈p , thick-skins have 
greater average fitness given any population share and therefore a polymorphic 
equilibrium does not exist.  □ 
  
 Since thin-skinned agents cannot exist in evolutionary equilibrium under 
purely random matching, let us consider their evolution under positive assortment.  
We adopt the assortment model of Hamilton (1971) as elaborated by Fagen (1980), 
with ]1,0[∈a as the exogenous parameter that represents the degree of assortment. 
6  The assortment model is as follows.  Let N(d) denote the proportion of dyads 
of type },,{ ABBBAAd ∈  in the population of all dyads formed in a given 
generation.  Given population shares of thin-skins ]1,0[∈p  and thick-skins 
pq −≡ 1 , our assumed assortment process produces the following proportions of 
the three possible dyad types: 
apqpBBN += 2)(       (3) 
apqqAAN += 2)(      (4) 
                                                  
6 Related formulations of assortment include Bergstrom’s (2003) “index of assortativity” and 
Taylor and Nowak’s (2006) “interaction rates.” 
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)1(2)( apqABN −=       (5) 
This specification of the assortment process is technically attractive because it 
continuously and monotonically connects the boundary cases of purely random 
matching (a = 0) and perfect assortment (a = 1).7   
Given this assortment process, the probability that a given thick-skinned 
agent is paired with a thin-skinned agent is 
pa
ABNAAN
ABNp A )1(
)()(2
)( −=+=      (6) 
and the probability that a given thin-skinned agent is paired with another thin-
skinned agent is 
 
)1(
)()(2
)(2 pap
ABNBBN
BBNpB −+=+=     (7) 
 After being matched, each dyad plays the demand game as described in 
Section 2.  The payoff earned by each type of agent is the fitness that determines 
the composition of the next generation of agents via a standard replicator dynamics.  
The average fitness of thick- and thin-skinned agents are respectively 
 )1)(1()1()( AAAA
A
AA
A FapFppAV −−+=+−= π    (8) 
12
))1(()( −−+== F
FpappBV BB
Bπ
     (9) 
 
The conditions under which thin-skinned agents evolve are as follows. 
 
Proposition 2.   
The unique evolutionarily stable population corresponding to assortment of degree 
a is  
 
 0ˆ =p   (thick-skin monomorphic) if min0 aa ≤≤    
 )1,0()(ˆ ∈ap  (polymorphic) if maxmin aaa <<    
 1ˆ =p  (thin-skin monomorphic) if 1max ≤≤ aa    
where  
0)12(min >−== F
FFa AA
BB
AA
π
π
     (10) 
1
)21)(1(
1
1
1
maxmin <−−
−=−
−=<
FF
Faa
AAAA
BB
π
π
   (11) 
                                                  
7 Conceptually, the assortment parameter a can be interpreted as a summary statistic of a “courtship” 
process by which pairs of agents imperfectly ascertain each other’s vulnerability to pain prior to 
entering into collaboration that produces gains to be divided.  Given the demand game, thin-skins 
are preferred as partner by both thin- and thick-skins; intermediate values of a correspond to the 
situation in which some thin-skins mistakenly enter into collaboration with a thick-skinned partner.  
After pairing but before division of gains, our agents find out the true type of partner, or, as analyzed 
in Section 5, estimate the probability of the partner’s type from p and a. 
D. Rtischev - Evolution of vulnerability to pain in interpersonal relations as a strategic trait aiding cooperation 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
8 
1)21()(1(
2
)1)(1(
)(ˆ −−+−
−+=−−−
−=
FFFa
FFaFF
a
aap
AA
AAAA
BBAA
AABB
ππ
ππ
  (12) 
 
Proof.   
If a polymorphic population )1,0(ˆ ∈p  is evolutionarily stable, then V(A) = V(B) 
when pp ˆ= .  Setting (8) equal to (9) and solving for p gives (12).  
Differentiating (12) shows that )(ˆ ap is monotonically increasing on (0, 1).  
Setting (12) equal to 0 and solving for a yields (10).  Setting (12) equal to 1 and 
solving for a yields (11).  It is straightforward to confirm that 10 maxmin <<< aa .  
For any ),0[ minaa∈  and ]1,0[∈p , V(A) > V(B), which implies 0=p  is the 
only stable population for any ),0[ minaa∈ .  For any ]1,( maxaa∈  and ]1,0[∈p , 
V(A) < V(B), which implies 1=p  is the only stable population for any 
]1,( maxaa∈ . For any ),( maxmin aaa∈ , V(A) > V(B)  if )(ˆ app >  and V(B) > 
V(A)  if )(ˆ app < , which implies that  )(ˆ ap  is a stable and unique equilibrium.  
□ 
 
Figure 3 illustrates how the fraction of thin-skins in the evolutionarily stable 
population depends on the degree of assortment.  Since 0min >a , some degree of 
assortment is needed for thin-skins to exist in equilibrium.  Since 1max <a , even 
with imperfect assortment thin-skins can completely displace thick-skins in 
equilibrium.  At intermediate degrees of assortment, a polymorphic population is 
stable, with stronger assortment corresponding to a higher population share of thin-
skins.   
 Comparative statics shows that the greater the pain the less the reliance on 
assortment for the evolution of thin-skin.  Since 0/min >∂∂ Fa , more pain (i.e., 
more negative F) corresponds to less assortment needed to admit thin-skins into 
evolutionarily stable populations.  Since 0/max >∂∂ Fa , more pain corresponds to 
less assortment needed to exclude thick-skins from evolutionarily stable 
populations.  Finally, since 0/)(ˆ <∂∂ Fap  for all ),( maxmin aaa∈ , an incremental 
increase in pain corresponds to an incremental rise in the share of thin-skins in any 
polymorphic equilibrium. 
In the extreme case of thin-skins vulnerable to infinitely intense pain, it 
follows from (1) that such thin-skins never demand ALL and therefore never fight.  
For such extremely vulnerable and peaceful thin-skins, the minimum degree of 
assortment needed to survive in a polymorphic equilibrium is  
AAF
Fa 2lim min =−∞→       (13) 
and the minimum degree of assortment needed to exclude all thick-skins is 
)1(2
1lim max
AA
F F
a −=−∞→      (14) 
In the further extreme case of thick-skins that completely dissipate the resource 
through fighting ( 0→AAF ), it follows from the above limits that an arbitrarily 
small degree of assortment would give rise to a polymorphic equilibrium with some 
extremely vulnerable/peaceful thin-skins present and if assortment exceeds 21≥a , 
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the extremely vulnerable/peaceful thin-skins would completely drive out the 
extremely wasteful/violent thick-skins. 
 
4. Proximate pain without ultimate injury 
 Vulnerability to pain raises the average fitness of thin-skins because in 
trying to avoid the pain they fight less often when paired together.  This reduction 
in the frequency of fighting outweighs the pain that thin skins suffer when they do 
fight.  But the pain need not necessarily be coupled to fitness as we have been 
assuming.  If the pain is merely perceived in the mind and has no fitness-relevant 
ramifications, then the instrumental role of pain can be more powerful.  Let us 
consider the case when pain is solely a proximate mechanism that operates at the 
level of agents’ strategic interaction in the demand game but not at the level of 
fitness and replication.   
 To model this, we assume that both thin- and thick-skinned agents play the 
demand game as if thin-skins are vulnerable to pain FBi, but when the fitness of 
thin-skin agents is calculated, FAi is used instead of FBi, for all },{ BAi∈ .  The 
only type of dyad in which it matters whether pain is fitness-relevant or proximate 
is the dyad in which pain actually occurs in equilibrium, namely the thin-skin 
homo-dyad.  In particular, when two thin-skins meet, each agent demands ALL 
with the same equilibrium mixing probability given by (1), but instead of obtaining 
the pain fitness F when a fight breaks out, each gets the pain-free fitness FAA.  
Thus, instead of (2) above, the fitness-relevant expected payoff to a thin-skinned 
agent in a homogenous dyad mixing with probability θ  is: 
2
2
2
12
)21(
)1(2)1()1(
F
FFFF AAAA
prox
BB −
−+=−+−+= θθθθπ
    (2’) 
It is straightforward to verify that AA
prox
BB ππ >  even without Assumption 4, which 
means that thin-skins vulnerable to any degree of proximate pain, however minor, 
obtain higher fitness when paired together than the fitness obtained by thick-skins 
when they are paired together.  It can also be readily verified that BB
prox
BB ππ > ; 
thus thin-skins enjoy more fitness if pain is proximate than if it is fitness-relevant.  
Yet as the next proposition establishes, even with this additional fitness thanks to 
pain being proximate thin-skins still cannot evolve under purely random matching. 
 
Proposition 3.   
If pain is proximate, under purely random pairing of agents the only evolutionarily 
stable population is thick-skin monomorphic. 
 
Proof.   
From (2’) it follows that ),0( 21∈proxBBπ .  The proof is analogous to the proof of 
Proposition 1 with proxBBπ  used in place of BBπ .       □ 
 
 The additional fitness enjoyed by thin-skins due to pain being merely 
proximate does make it easier for thin-skinned agents to evolve under positive 
assortment.  The next two propositions make this precise.  The dotted curve in 
Figure 3 illustrates the effect of proximate pain. 
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Proposition 4.   
Under Assumptions 1-3 and for any degree of proximate pain F < 0, if positive 
assortment is sufficiently strong, then there is a unique evolutionarily stable 
equilibrium in which thin-skinned agents are present.  Specifically, the unique 
evolutionarily stable population corresponding to assortment of degree a is  
 
 0ˆ =proxp   if proxaa min0 ≤≤    
 )1,0()(ˆ ∈ap prox  if proxprox aaa maxmin <<    
 1ˆ =proxp   if 1max ≤≤ aa prox    
where  
0
)1(2
)12( 2
min >−+
−=
FFF
FFa
AA
AAprox
     (10’) 
1
)21)(1(
)1(21
2maxmin <−−
−+−=<
FF
FFFaa
AA
AAproxprox
    (11’) 
))1(21)(21)(1(
)1(2))12(()(ˆ
2
−+−−
−+−−=
FFFa
FaFFaFap
AA
AAprox
    (12’) 
 
Proof.   
The proof is analogous to the proof of Proposition 2 with proxBBπ  used in place of 
BBπ .  The minimum pain Assumption 4 is not necessary since (2’) implies 
AA
prox
BB ππ >  for any F < 0.   □ 
 
Proposition 5.   
For a given degree of assortment, the share of thin-skinned agents in an 
evolutionarily stable population is weakly higher if the pain is proximate than if the 
pain is fitness-relevant. 
 
Proof.   
From equations (10) through (12) and (10’) through (12’) it follows that  
minmin aa
prox < ,  maxmax aa prox < ,  and ),()(ˆ)(ˆ maxmin proxprox aaaapap ∈∀> .  □ 
 
 More generally, if a thin-skinned agent fights another agent, its proximate 
payoff can be expressed as yFF AA −=  and its fitness-relevant payoff can be 
expressed as zFU AA −= , where we can think of AAFy >  as “pain” and 0≥z  
as “injury.”  In Section 3, we analyzed the case y = z.  In this section, we 
analyzed the case z = 0.  The two cases are extremes:  the former assumes that 
pain precisely tracks injury whereas the latter assumes there is no injury but only 
pain.  In the intermediate and more realistic case, thin-skins suffer injuries (z > 0) 
but the pain they feel (or anticipate feeling) may either overstate (y > z) or 
understate (y < z) it.  The greater the pain, the less frequent the fighting between 
thin-skins, but the fitness gained due to less fighting is reduced by injury that 
fighting causes.  Thus, for a given level of pain, the more the pain overstates injury, 
the easier it is for thin-skins to evolve, in the sense of lesser reliance on positive 
assortment.  Conversely, if pain understates injury, the more difficult it is for thin-
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skins to evolve.  This line of reasoning leads us to conjecture that evolution is 
likely to favor pain that overstates rather than understates injury. 
 
5.  Imperfect type information: skin thickness not 
observable 
  A critical but unrealistic assumption underlying our analysis so far is that 
agents can distinguish those who are vulnerable to pain from those who are not.  
In this section we relax the assumption that skin thickness is observable.  Instead, 
we assume that besides knowing one’s own vulnerability, an agent only has 
population-level type information, namely the population share of thin-skins and 
the degree of assortment.   
The key to analyzing this case is the fact that for a thick-skinned agent, 
HALF is a dominated strategy regardless of the type of opponent in its dyad.  Thus, 
whether it knows the type of its dyad opponent or not, a thick-skinned agent 
maximizes its payoff by demanding ALL.  A thin-skinned agent, however, prefers 
to demand HALF against a thick-skin and mix against another thin-skin.  Since it 
cannot see the type of opponent, the thin-skinned agent estimates of type of its dyad 
opponent according to (7) and chooses the payoff maximizing strategy based on 
this estimate.   
 
Proposition 6.   
If matching is random, thickness of skin unobservable, and agents know the 
population share of thin-skins, then the only evolutionarily stable population is 
thick-skin monomorphic. 
 
Proof.   
Same as proof of Proposition 7(i) below with a = 0.  □ 
 
Thus, whether type information is available at the dyad level (Proposition 
1) or at the population level (Proposition 6), thin-skins cannot evolve under purely 
random matching.  We next introduce assortment and find that ignorance at the 
dyad level actually helps thin-skins, in the sense that less assortment is needed to 
allow thin-skins to evolve under population-level information than under dyad-level 
information.  The following proposition states the details and Figure 4 illustrates.  
We use the superscript “pop” to distinguish the population-level type information 
case. 
 
Proposition 7.   
If thickness of skin is not observable but population share of thin-skins p and the 
degree of assortment a are common knowledge, then the evolutionarily stable 
population is as follows: 
(i) For any ],0[ min
popaa∈ , the unique evolutionarily stable population is thick-
skin monomorphic, 0ˆ =p .   
(ii) For any ],( min aaa
pop∈ , the unique evolutionarily stable population is 
polymorphic, with the share of thin-skins given by  
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AA
pop
I Fa
ap
21
1
1
1)(ˆ −−−=      (15) 
Thin-skinned agents always demand HALF. 
(iii) For any ),( max
popaaa∈ , the unique evolutionarily stable population is 
polymorphic, with the share of thin-skins given by  
))(21)(1(22
1)(ˆ
AAAB
ABpop
II FFFa
TFFap −−−
−−−=     (16) 
where 
2
1)])()21()(21(4
))1))(1(2()1[(( 2
AAABAA
AAABABAA
FFFFFFa
FFaFaFFaT
−+−−−
−−−++−=
 (17) 
Thin-skin agents play the mixed strategy demanding ALL with probability 
))ˆ1(ˆ)(21(
21*
papF
F
−+−+=θ      (18) 
(iv) For any ]1,[ max
popaa∈ , the unique evolutionarily stable population is thin-skin 
monomorphic, 1ˆ =p .  Thin-skin agents play the mixed strategy 
demanding ALL with probability )21/(1* F−=θ .  
 
The boundaries of the above intervals are given by 
AA
pop Fa 2min =       (19) 
)1)(21( AA
AA
FF
FFa −−
−=
     (20) 
)1(2)(max AAAAAB
ABpop
FFFF
FFa −−−
−=
   (21) 
 
Proof.   
See Appendix. 
 
 Comparing the results of this section to the full-information case of Section 
3 reveals that thin-skins evolve with less assortment and behave less aggressively 
when type information is available at the population level than when it is known at 
the dyad-level.   
 
Proposition 8.   
For a given degree of assortment, the share of thin-skinned agents in an 
evolutionarily stable population is weakly higher under population-level type 
information than under perfect observability of skin thickness.  
 
Proof.   
See Appendix. 
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Intuitively, a veil of uncertainty helps thin-skins because the higher the 
likelihood that a thin-skinned agent estimates that the opponent will demand ALL, 
the less is the payoff it can expect from demanding ALL itself.  Therefore, 
uncertainty about the type of opponent induces thin-skins to demand ALL less often 
or not at all, which helps them avoid fights with each other.  Thick-skins, however, 
always demand ALL whether they know the type of opponent or not, and therefore 
their behavior is the same under either information regime.   
Figure 4 illustrates how a veil of uncertainty helps thin-skins to evolve.  A 
numerical example also helps illustrate.  Suppose fighting between thick-skins 
wastes 80% of the resource (FAA = 0.1), domination of a thin-skin by a thick-skin 
wastes 20% of the resource (FAB = 0.8), and pain is commensurate with the entire 
resource (F = –1).  Under population-level type information, thin-skins cannot 
evolve if assortment is weaker than 2.0min =popa .  When assortment is between 
2.0min =popa  and 4.0=a , population includes only peaceful thin-skins that always 
demand HALF and whose share can be as high as %44)(ˆ =ap pop  of the 
population.  If the degree of assortment exceeds 4.0=a , thin-skins mix between 
demanding HALF and ALL, and their population share rises to 100% as the degree 
of assortment rises to 72.0max =popa .  If, however, agents can observe others’ skin 
thickness, peaceful thin skins never evolve, and mixing thin skins evolve only if the 
degree of assortment exceeds 3.0min =a  and dominate the population only if 
assortment exceeds 74.0max =a . 
 
6. Sequential play in demand game 
 In this section, we re-specify the demand game in extensive form, letting 
agents in each dyad announce their demands sequentially with the first-mover 
chosen via an unbiased random draw.  Although a much more nuanced picture of 
how vulnerable agents evolve emerges, overall we confirm that the main qualitative 
aspects of our findings do not critically depend on the assumption of perfectly 
simultaneous play.  Doing away with both simultaneity and observability 
assumptions, Section 6.2 details a surprisingly intricate and non-monotonic 
relationship between assortment and evolution of vulnerable agents. 
  
6.1 Perfect type information 
 Under perfect type information and sequential demands, there are four types 
of dyads that must be distinguished: A1A2, B1B2, A1B2, and B1A2 (subscript 
indicates move order).   Backward induction on the game trees shown in Figure 5 
reveals that the payoffs to agents in AA and AB dyads are independent of the order 
in which agents move and equal the payoffs in the simultaneous-move demand 
game; that is, each A in a homo-dyad earns AAAA F=π , an A in a hetero-dyad earns 
1=ABπ , and a B in a hetero-dyad earns 0=BAπ .  The order of play only makes a 
difference in the B1B2 dyad: the payoffs are 1 for the first-moving agent and 0 for 
the second-moving agent.  Assuming play order is determined by an unbiased 
random draw, a thin-skinned agent when paired with another earns 21=BBπ on 
average, which is strictly larger than the expected payoff in simultaneous-move BB 
D. Rtischev - Evolution of vulnerability to pain in interpersonal relations as a strategic trait aiding cooperation 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
14 
dyads given by (2).  Figure 6 summarizes all the payoffs in all the dyads in a 
payoff matrix.  This matrix represents the stage game of the evolutionary game 
and is a Prisoners’ Dilemma, just like before except that the minimum pain 
threshold Assumption 4 is not needed.  The following propositions specify 
conditions under which thin-skinned agents evolve. 
 
Proposition 9.   
If each agent can observe the type of its opponent and the agents make demands 
sequentially, the only evolutionarily stable population under purely random 
matching is thick-skin monomorphic. 
 
Proof.   
The proof is analogous to the proof of Proposition 1, using 21=BBπ  instead of 
BBπ  given by (2).  □ 
 
Proposition 10.   
If each agent can observe the type of its opponent and the agents make demands 
sequentially, the unique evolutionarily stable population corresponding to 
assortment of degree a is  
 
 0ˆ =p  if min0 aa ≤≤    
 )1,0()(ˆ ∈ap   if maxmin aaa <<    
 1ˆ =p   if 1max ≤≤ aa    
where  
02min >= AAFa       (10”) 
1
)1(2
1
maxmin <−=< AAF
aa
     (11”) 
AAFa
ap
21
1
1
1)(ˆ −−−=      (12”) 
 
Proof.   
The proof is analogous to the proof of Proposition 2, using 21=BBπ  instead of 
BBπ  given in (2).  □ 
 
Thus, if the demand game is played sequentially under perfect type 
information, the only parameter that matters for the evolution of thin-skins is thick-
skins’ level of efficiency when allocating the resource by fighting each other, 
namely AAF .  There is no fighting in equilibrium and therefore the extent of thin-
skins’ pain F is irrelevant.  Any non-zero amount of pain, or even proximate pain 
in the sense of Section 4, lead to the same fitness and equilibria.  The shape of the 
curve representing the fraction of thin-skins in the evolutionarily stable population 
as a function of the degree of assortment is qualitatively the same as in the case of 
simultaneous demands under full information (Figure 3).  Moreover, since (12”) is 
identical to (15) and (10”) is identical to (19), it is straightforward to adapt the 
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proof of Proposition 8 to show that less assortment is needed for a given population 
share of thin-skins to evolve with sequential demands than with simultaneous 
demands.  Intuitively, announcing demands sequentially facilitates the evolution 
of thin-skins because it lets them coordinate so as to avoid all fighting and raise 
their homo-dyad payoffs to BBBB ππ >= 21 . 
 
6.2 Population-level type information 
 As we did in Section 5, we now suppose agents cannot observe others’ skin 
thickness but population shares and degree of assortment are common knowledge.  
Examining the game trees in Figure 5 reveals that the best-response of the second-
mover of any type in any dyad is the same whether the agent knows or doesn’t 
know the type of the first-mover.  Moreover, the first-moving thick-skinned agent 
does best by demanding ALL whether it knows the type of its opponent or not.  
The only player whose demand decision is impaired by unobservability of the type 
of its opponent is the first-moving thin-skinned agent.  Figure 7 shows the game in 
which a thin-skinned agent moves first.  If the probability that the opponent has 
thick-skin is high enough, the first-moving thin-skin prefers to play it safe by 
demanding HALF, but if the probability is low enough it prefers to demand ALL.  
As the next proposition and Figure 8 show, this leads to a nuanced picture of how 
pain and assortment enable the evolution of thin-skinned agents.  Unlike our 
earlier findings, on some ranges greater assortment corresponds to lower population 
share of thin-skins. 
 
Proposition 11.   
If agents make demands sequentially, pain is strong enough to satisfy 
)12/(2 −< AAAA FFF , thickness of skin is not observable but population share of 
thin-skins p and the degree of assortment a are common knowledge, then the 
evolutionarily stable populations are as follows: 
(i) For any ],0[ minaa∈ , the unique evolutionarily stable population is thick-
skin monomorphic, 0ˆ =p .  Thin-skinned agents demand HALF when 
moving first.  
(ii) For any ),( min aaa∈ , the unique evolutionarily stable population is 
polymorphic, with the share of thin-skins given by (12”).  Thin-skinned 
agents demand HALF when moving first. 
(iii) For ),( 0aaa∈ , the unique evolutionarily stable population is polymorphic, 
with the share of thin-skins given by 
)1)(1(
11ˆ
Fa
p −−−=     (22) 
The fraction of thin-skinned agents who demand ALL when moving 
first is  
FFFFa
FFFFax
ABAB
AAAA
−−−
+−−−=
)1)(1(
2)1)(1(2ˆ
    (23) 
the remaining )ˆ1( x−  fraction of thin-skins demand HALF when 
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moving first.8 
(iv) For any ),( 20 aaa∈ , an evolutionarily stable population is thick-skin 
monomorphic, 0ˆ =p .  Thin-skinned agents demand ALL when moving 
first.  
(v) For any ]1,( 1aa∈ , an evolutionarily stable population is thin-skin 
monomorphic, 1ˆ =p .  Thin-skinned agents demand ALL when moving 
first.  
(vi) If ABAA FFF −< 2 , then 21 aa <  and both monomorphic populations are 
evolutionarily stable for any ],[ 21 aaa∈  
(vii) If ABAA FFF −> 2 , then 21 aa >  and for any ),( 12 aaa∈  the unique 
evolutionarily stable population is polymorphic, with the share of thin-skins 
given by 
)2)(1(
2)1(ˆ
FFFa
FFFap
ABAA
AA
−−−
−+−=
    (24) 
Thin-skinned agents demand ALL when moving first. 
  
The boundaries of the above intervals are given by 
 
AAFa 2min =       (25) 
)1)(1(2
2
AA
AA
FF
FFa −−
−=
     (26) 
10 −= F
Fa
      (27) 
ABAA
AB
FF
Fa +−= 211      (28) 
F
FFa AA−
−=
1
2
2
     (29) 
 
Proof.   
See Appendix. 
 
 The case of sequential demands under population-level type information 
differs from all other cases that we have considered in that increasing assortment 
may hinder the evolution of thin-skins.  This happens on the interval ),( 0aa , 
where greater degrees of assortment correspond to a smaller share of thin-skins in 
stable polymorphic populations.  This is a region of transition from “meek” thin-
skins (those who demand HALF when moving first) to “assertive” thin-skins (those 
who demand ALL when moving first).  Except for this relatively small region, 
stronger assortment helps thin-skins evolve, consistent with our earlier results.  
                                                  
8 Equivalently, under a mixed-strategy interpretation, xˆ  is the probability with which every thin-
skinned agent demands ALL when moving first.  
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Comparing to the perfect-information case of Section 6.1, it is notable that the 
unobservability of types does not affect the evolution of thin-skins at low degrees 
of assortment aa < , impedes their evolution at intermediate degrees of assortment, 
and can help thin-skins achieve the monomorphic population in the sense that 
max1 aa < (see Figure 8).  Intuitively, the reason why not knowing the type of 
opponent helps thin-skins in the monomorphic equilibrium is because a thick-
skinned mutant attempting to invade such a population earns FAB against a first-
moving assertive thin-skin, which is less than 1 that  the mutant would have 
earned if he could display his thick skin and thereby intimidate the thin-skin to 
demand HALF.  Thus, ignorance hurts the unlucky thin-skin who gets paired with 
the mutant but helps defend the population of thin-skins against invasion by the 
mutants.  
 
7. Discussion: Relation to Hawk-Dove and the role of 
rational choice and information  
Like the classic Hawk-Dove model (Maynard Smith and Parker, 1976), we 
have studied the evolutionary logic of conflict in a population composed of 
aggressive and peaceful agents.  Both models share the same basic structure: two 
agent types, pairwise matching, action set {aggress, yield}, and replicator dynamics.  
Yet the equilibria in the two models are different:  Doves evolve under random 
matching but thin-skins do not.  Since the most important lesson of the Hawk-
Dove model is that peaceful agents evolve alongside aggressive ones without any 
rational choice by the agents or bias in the pairing process, it is instructive to 
understand why this finding was not replicated in our model. 
Comparing the payoffs in homogeneous and heterogeneous dyads reveals 
the same pattern in both models: two peaceful agents paired together earn higher 
fitness than two aggressive agents, but when the two different types meet, the 
aggressive one earns more than the peaceful.  What is not the same is the  
relative size of the payoff earned by the aggressive type in a homo-dyad compared 
to what the peaceful type earns in a hetero-dyad.  Specifically, whereas a Hawk 
who fights another Hawk earns less than a Dove who yields to a Hawk, a thick-skin 
who fights another thick-skin earns more than a thin-skin who yields to a thick-skin.  
As a consequence, the stage game in Hawk-Dove is Chicken and in our model it is 
Prisoners’ Dilemma (Figure 2).  The different nature of the stage game leads to 
different evolutionary properties. 
If Hawks were not hard-wired to always escalate but could choose to go 
away without a fight, then in the Hawk-Hawk dyad Hawks would play a mixed 
strategy analogous to (1).  Hawks would then earn a positive payoff in homo-
dyads as in (2), the stage game would be a Prisoners’ Dilemma, and Doves would 
not evolve under random matching.  Thus, the celebrated finding that Doves 
evolve under random matching critically rests on the Hawks being greatly 
handicapped on two accounts: first, fighting between Hawks is so wasteful that its 
cost exceeds the value of the resource being divided, and second, Hawks are so 
stupid and inflexible that they cannot do anything but fight.  It is not too surprising 
that Doves can evolve among such handicapped Hawks even without assortment. 
Giving Hawks rational choice capability would thus undermine Dove’s 
ability to evolve.  In our model, both types are given rational choice capability.  
If we were to take away rational choice and instead assume that thick-skins are 
hard-wired to always aggress and thin-skins to always yield, the stage game would 
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remain a Prisoners’ Dilemma but the payoffs would change from the matrix in 
Figure 2 to the matrix in Figure 6.  The reason is that since thick-skins always 
choose to aggress in all dyads, hard-wiring them has no effect.  However, hard-
wiring thin-skins to always yield actually helps them avoid the occasional fighting 
among themselves and thereby raises their payoffs in homo-dyads.  Although this 
is not sufficient to enable thin-skins to evolve under random matching, hard-wiring 
helps them evolve in the sense of lowering the degree of assortment needed to 
achieve any given positive and stable population share.  In terms of equilibrium 
play in dyads, assuming agents are hard-wired turns out to be equivalent to 
assuming the demand game is played sequentially and under perfect information as 
in Section 6.1, and the evolutionarily stable populations are as in Proposition 10.   
Thus, both in Hawk-Dove and in our model, “upgrading” the agents from 
zero-intelligence to rational choice has the effect of impeding the evolution of the 
vulnerable-peaceful type.  There are two other respects in which additional 
rationality and information hinder the evolution of vulnerable-peaceful agents.  
We found in Section 4 that if pain operates only at the proximate level, then thin-
skinned agents can evolve with a lesser degree of assortment than otherwise, and 
conjectured that pain is more likely to evolve to overstate rather than understate 
ultimate consequences.  Critical has been the assumption that agents’ cognitive 
sphere is not so wide as to include calculation of ultimate fitness.  If agents’ self-
knowledge and self-control were to expand to realize and act upon the fact that 
what really counts is not proximate feelings but just the “bottom-line” of ultimate 
fitness, the beneficial role of proximate pain would disappear.  
In a similar vein, in Sections 5 and 6 we found that thin-skins can evolve 
with less assortment under the veil of uncertainty of population-level type 
information than under perfect observability of skin thickness within dyads.  That 
better type information can hurt the evolution of cooperative agents is the opposite 
of what Guth and Kliemt (1998) found in the context of the trust game.  The 
reason is that in the trust game better type information promotes more trusting and 
thereby raises the fitness of the trustworthy type. In our game, however, better type 
information promotes more aggression by thin-skins against other thin-skins, which 
reduces the fitness of the thin-skins.  Conversely, a thin-skin operating behind the 
veil of uncertainty has a lower expected benefit of aggressing, which induces thin-
skins to aggress less and earn more fitness.  
 
8. Conclusion 
We have analyzed whether agents who are vulnerable to pain when trying 
to divide a resource can evolve in a population that includes agents who do not feel 
pain.  In a model that combines rational choice with evolutionary selection, we 
found that thin-skinned agents cannot evolve under random matching, but with 
sufficient assortment they can take over any positive share of the population.  It is 
the prospect of pain that makes thin-skins relatively less aggressive.  However, 
risking pain is sometimes worth it, and in equilibrium thin-skins sometimes aggress 
and sometimes suffer the pain.  Ironically, this occasional aggression and suffering 
by thin-skins occurs because they rationally try to exploit the vulnerability of other 
thin-skins.  Pain thus appears at the center of the interplay between evolutionary 
selection and rational decision-making:  evolution selects individuals that are 
vulnerable to pain, since doing so raises relative fitness, and vulnerable individuals 
rationally take on some risk of actually suffering the pain, since doing so increases 
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payoffs.   
 One conclusion that comes out from our analysis is that assortment 
promotes the evolution of the vulnerable-peaceful type of agent.  This agrees with 
Fagen’s (1980) finding that assortment in the Hawk-Dove model leads to a 
“conspiracy of doves” equilibrium in which there are no Hawks and Bergstrom’s 
(2003) finding that assortment enables cooperation in evolutionary Prisoners’ 
Dilemma.  It is also consistent with the general arguments of Hamilton (1971) and 
Skyrms (1994) that introducing correlation into the matching process can 
profoundly change the nature of an evolutionary game, yielding equilibria that 
differ from those under random matching and possibly with more cooperation and 
efficiency.  
A second conclusion is that rational choice and information hinder the 
evolution of the vulnerable-peaceful type of agent.  Thin-skins need less 
assortment to evolve if they are hard-wired to always compromise, or are kept in 
the dark about the proximate nature of the pain they feel, or are unsure about what 
kind of opponent they are facing.      
  
Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 7 
For a thick-skinned agent, HALF is a dominated strategy regardless of the 
type of opponent in its dyad.  Thus, agent of type A demands ALL.  A thin-
skinned agent prefers to demand HALF against A and mix against B, but he can 
only estimate which type he is facing in his dyad according to (7).  Suppose each 
B agent plays ALL with probability ]1,0[∈θ .  Then, the expected payoffs to a B 
agent from playing ALL and HALF are 
))1(()1()( θθπ −++−= FpFpALL BBB     (30) 
)1())1(0(0)1()( 2121 θθθπ −=−++−= BBBB pppHALF   (31) 
Setting )()( ALLHALF BB ππ = and solving for p assuming 0=θ  gives 
)21)(1(
11)(
Fa
ap −−−≡ .  This curve partitions the space of all populations and 
assortment degrees into two regions, as follows.   
 
Case I.  If )(0 app <≤ , then )()( ALLHALF BB ππ >  for any ]1,0[∈θ  and 
therefore B always demands HALF.  This is the case in which there are few other 
thin-skins and/or assortment is weak, so that it’s best for a thin-skin to play it safe 
by demanding HALF.  The average fitness of the two types are: 
)1)(1()1()( AAAA
A
AA
A FapFpFpAV −−+=+−=   (32) 
))1(()( 2121 apapBV
B −+==     (33) 
If a stable polymorphic equilibrium exists at pˆ , then V(A) = V(B), which implies 
(15).  Setting 0ˆ =p  and solving for a gives (19).  Setting pp =ˆ  and solving 
for a gives (20). 
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Case II. If 1)( ≤≤ pap , then there exists a unique ]1,0[* ∈θ  such that 
)()( HALFALL BB ππ = .  Solving this equation for θ  gives (18).  The average 
fitness of the two types when thin skins mix with probability *θ  is: 
))1(()1()( ** θθ −++−= ABAAAA FpFpAV    (34) 
12
)1()( *21 −=−= F
FpBV B θ       (35) 
If a stable polymorphic population exists at pˆ , then V(A) = V(B), which yields 
(16)-(17).  Setting pp =ˆ  and solving for a gives (20) and establishes the 
continuity of polymorphic equilibria on the boundary between Cases I and II.  
Setting 1ˆ =p  and solving for a gives (21).  It is straightforward to confirm that if 
p = 1, then V(B) > V(A) for all )1,( max
popaa∈ , which implies stability.   □ 
 
Proof of Proposition 8 
 Subtracting (19) from (10) establishes that minmin aa
pop < , which implies that 
on ],0[ min
popa  there are no thin-skins under either information regime and on 
],( minmin aa
pop  there are thin-skins under the population-level information but not 
under perfect information.  Subtracting (21) from (11) establishes that maxmax aa
pop < , 
which implies that on ]1,[ maxa  thin-skins have 100% population share under either 
information regime and on ],[ maxmax aa
pop  thin-skins have 100% population share 
under population-level information but not under perfect information.  On 
),( min aaa∈ , comparing (8) with (32) and (9) with (33) shows that thick-skins have 
the same average fitness under both regimes but thin-skins have strictly higher 
fitness under population-level information.  By continuity, this implies that thin-
skins hold higher population share for any ),( min aaa∈ .  On ),( maxpopaaa∈ , 
comparing (8) with (34) shows that thick-skins have lower average fitness under 
population-level information than under perfect information; comparing and (9) 
with (35) shows that thin-skins have higher average fitness under population-level 
information than under perfect information.  By continuity, this implies that thin-
skins hold higher population share for any ),( max
popaaa∈ .  □ 
 
Proof of Proposition 11 
 A thick-skinned agent maximizes its payoff by demanding ALL under all 
circumstances.  A thin-skinned agent moving second maximizes its payoff by 
demanding HALF in response to ALL and vice versa.  A first-moving thin-skinned 
agent who demands HALF earns 0)( =HALFfirstBπ ; if it instead demands ALL, the 
expected payoff is BBfirstB pFpALL +−= )1()(π .  Setting 
)()( ALLHALF firstB
first
B ππ = and solving for proportion of thin-skins gives 
)1)(1(
11)(
Fa
ap −−−≡ .  This curve partitions the space of all populations and 
assortment degrees into two regions, as follows.  For all 
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)}(|),{(),( appapap <∈  first-moving thin-skins demand HALF.  For all 
)}(|),{(),( appapap >∈  first-moving thin-skins demand ALL.  On the 
boundary, )}(|),{(),( appapap =∈  first-moving thin-skins are indifferent 
between demanding ALL and HALF.  The proof proceeds by considering the two 
regions and the boundary as separate cases: 
 
Case I. )}(|),{(),( appapap <∈ .  This is the case in which there are few other 
thin-skins and/or the assortment is weak, so that it’s best for the thin-skinned agent 
to play it safe by demanding HALF.  The average fitness of the two types are the 
same as in the full-information case of Section 6.1: 
A
AA
A pFpAV +−= )1()(     (36) 
BpBV 21)( =       (37) 
If a stable polymorphic equilibrium exists at pˆ , then V(A) = V(B), which implies 
(12”).  Differentiating (12”) shows that pˆ  is monotonically increasing in a.  
Setting 0ˆ =p  and solving for a gives (25).  Setting pp =ˆ  and solving for a 
gives (26).   The population 0ˆ =p  is stable on ),0[ mina  since V(A) > V(B) for 
all ),0[ minaa∈  such that )(app < .  The population given by (12”) is stable on 
),[ min aa  since V(A) = V(B) for )(ˆ app = , V(A) < V(B) for )(ˆ app < , and V(A) > 
V(B) for )(ˆ app > . 
 
Case II.  )}(|),{(),( appapap >∈  This is the case in which there are many 
other thin-skins and/or the assortment is strong, so that the payoff-maximizing 
strategy for the thin-skinned agent is to assume the opponent in his dyad is another 
a thin-skin and try to exploit its vulnerability to pain by demanding ALL.  The 
average fitness of the two types are: 
)1()1()( 21 ++−= ABAAAA FpFpAV     (38) 
BB pFpBV 2121 )1()( +−=       (39) 
Monomorphic thick-skin population is stable if V(A) > V(B) when p = 0.  This 
holds if  2aa < , where 2a  is given by (29).  Monomorphic thin-skin population 
is stable if V(A) < V(B) when p = 1.  This holds if 1aa > , where 1a  is given by 
(28).  If ABAA FFF −> 2 , then 21 aa > ; solving V(A) = V(B) for p gives (24).  
The population given by (24) is stable since V(A) < V(B) for )(ˆ app < , and V(A) > 
V(B) for )(ˆ app > . 
 
Case III.  )}(|),{(),( appapap =∈  This is the case in which the first-moving 
thin-skin is indifferent between demanding ALL or HALF.  Let x be the fraction of 
thin-skins that demand ALL when moving first in a dyad.   The average fitness of 
thick- and thin-skins are, respectively: 
)1))1((()1()( 21 +−++−= xxFpFpAV ABAAAA   (40) 
BB pxFpBV 2121 )1()( +−=       (41) 
Solving V(A) = V(B) for x gives (23), which is the unique proportion of “assertive” 
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thin-skins necessary for evolutionary stability of a polymorphic population along 
the boundary between Cases I and II.  Differentiating (23) shows that xˆ is 
monotonically increasing in a, and is thus uniquely determined for each a or p.  It 
is straightforward to confirm that ]1,0[ˆ∈x  for all ],[ 0aaa∈  and 0ˆ <x  for all 
),0[ aa∈ .  Solving 0)( =ap  gives (27) and establishes the upper bound on 
assortment in this Case III.  This population is stable because for )(app < the 
average fitness of thin-skins (37) is higher than average fitness of thick-skins (36), 
and for )(app > the average fitness of thick-skins (38) is higher than average 
fitness of thin-skins (39).  □ 
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                   Agent type j 
  ALL HALF 
Agent type i 
ALL Fij    Fji 1    0 
HALF 0     1 21    21  
 
Figure 1  Payoff matrix of the demand game between agents of type },{, BAji ∈  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  A (thick-skin) B (thin-skin) 
 
A  FAA     FAA 1         0 
B  0        1 
12 −F
F
   
12 −F
F
  
 
Figure 2  Payoff matrix of the stage game, derived from equilibria of the demand 
game played in the three types of dyads. 
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Figure 3  Fraction of thin-skinned agents in evolutionarily stable population as a 
function of the degree of assortment.  The dotted curve shows the proximate pain case 
discussed in Section 4. 
 
 
 
Figure 4  Fraction of thin-skinned agents in evolutionarily stable population as a 
function of the degree of assortment when agents cannot observe type of opponent in 
dyad but know population share of thin-skins and degree of assortment.  In the Case I 
region thin-skins always demand HALF.  In the Case II region, thin-skins mix 
between ALL and HALF.  The dotted curve shows the full-information case from 
Section 3.  In the case shown aa <min ; in the other possible case popaaa maxmin << .    
  
a 
pˆ
1 0 
1 
mina maxaa
popamaxpopamin
Case I Case II 
)(ap
a 
pˆ
1 0 
1 
mina maxa
proxamin
proxamax
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Figure 5  Extensive-form demand game played in dyads under perfect information.  
Arrows indicate subgame-perfect strategy at each node. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  A (thick-skin) B (thin-skin) 
 
A  FAA    FAA 1      0 
B  0      1 21      21   
 
Figure 6  Payoff matrix of the stage game assuming the demand game is played 
sequentially, with order of play determined by a random draw. 
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Figure 7  Extensive-form demand game played under imperfect information in the 
dyad in which B moves first.  Initial node N is “nature’s” hidden move that determines 
whether the dyad is BA or BB.  Arrows indicate dominant strategy for the second 
mover. 
 
),( FF
)0,1(HALF
)1,0(
),( 2121
ALL
HALF
ALL
HALF
ALL
),( ABFF
)0,1(HALF
)1,0(
),( 2121
ALL
HALF
ALL
HALF
A
ALL
A
N
Bp
Bp−1
1B
1B
2B
2B
D. Rtischev - Evolution of vulnerability to pain in interpersonal relations as a strategic trait aiding cooperation 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
27 
Strong pain ABAA FFF −< 2  
 
 
Weak pain ABAA FFF −> 2  
 
Figure 8  Fraction of thin-skinned agents in evolutionarily stable population as a 
function of the degree of assortment when agents make demands sequentially, cannot 
observe type of opponent in dyad, but know population shares and degree of 
assortment.  In the Case I region first-moving thin-skins demand HALF.  In the Case 
II region, first-moving thin-skins demand ALL.  In the Case III region, a fraction xˆ  
of first-moving thin-skins demands ALL and the rest demand HALF.  The dotted 
curve shows the full-information case of Section 6.1. 
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